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Abstract
We extend the war of attrition and all-pay auction analysis of Krishna and Morgan
(1997) to a stochastic competition setting. We determine the existence of equilibrium
bidding strategies and discuss the potential shape of these strategies. Results for the war
of attrition contrast with the characterization of the bidding equilibrium strategies in the
first-price all-pay auction as well as the winner-pay auctions. Furthermore we investigate
the expected revenue comparisons among the war of attrition, the all-pay auction and the
winner-pay auctions and discuss the Linkage Principle as well. Our findings are applicable
to future works on contests and charity auctions.
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JEL Classification: D44, D82
1 Introduction
The wide and growing literature on all-pay auctions assumes that the number of bidders
is common knowledge. Yet, in many situations where all-pay auctions illustrate economic,
social and political issues, participants do not know the number of their opponents. Indeed,
in lobbying contests, R&D races or battles to control some markets, agents do not know the
exact number of their rivals. In a lobbying contest, some groups of interest give a bribe to
the decision maker in order to obtain a market or a political favor. In R&D races, firms
compete each other to be the first one to obtain a patent. The money spent in this race is
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not refundable. More generally, the effect of an unknown number of bidders is an important
question in auction theory (see the recent papers of Harstad, Pekec, and Tsetlin (2008) and
Pekec and Tsetlin (2008)). However, to our knowledge there is no analysis of all-pay auctions
with an uncertain number of bidders.
Krishna and Morgan (1997) analyzed these auction designs with affiliated signals where
the number of bidders is fixed and common knowledge. In this paper, we extend their analysis
to a stochastic competition framework. In the following we call “all-pay auction” the first-
price all-pay auction and “war of attrition” the second-price all-pay auction. We focus on
equilibrium bidding strategies analysis and expected revenue comparisons as most of previous
papers on winner-pay auctions with uncertain number of bidders.
McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Matthews (1987) studied first-price auctions with a
stochastic number of bidders. They determined whether it is better to conceal or to reveal
the information about the number of bidders for first and second-price winner-pay auctions in
different frameworks.1 However, they did not characterize the equilibrium strategies. Using
a model a` la Milgrom and Weber (1982) with independent private signals instead of affili-
ated ones, Harstad, Kagel, and Levin (1990) established that equilibrium bids with stochastic
competition are weighted averages of the equilibrium bids in auctions where the number of
bidders is common knowledge. Krishna (2002) investigated this result in another way with
an independent private value model. In a recent paper Harstad, Pekec, and Tsetlin (2008)
found the same result in multi-unit winner-pay auctions with common value.2 Pekec and
Tsetlin (2008) also investigate multi-unit auctions with unknown number of bidders. Indeed
they determine the ranking of the expected revenues for uniform and discriminatory auctions.
In addition they compare the expected revenues for each auction design when the number of
bidders is known and unknown.
In this paper we determine the equilibrium strategies for the all-pay auction and the war of
attrition under a monotonicity assumption when the number of bidders is unknown. Indeed we
assume the Bayesian assessment of the bidder’s value times a hazard rate given a stochastic
number of bidders is an increasing function in the bidder’s signal. It is a generalization
of an assumption of Krishna and Morgan (1997) when the number of bidders is fixed and
common knowledge. The consistency of this assumption is discussed through an example.
The equilibrium strategies of the all-pay auction, as well as winner-pay auctions (Harstad,
Kagel, and Levin, 1990), is a weighted average of equilibrium strategies that would be chosen
for each number of bidders. However, it is not obvious for the war of attrition. Indeed,
contrary to the – first and second-price – winner-pay auctions, it does not directly follow
from the first order condition that the equilibrium strategy should be equal to a weighted
1Matthews (1987) considered bidders with an increasing, a decreasing or a constant absolute risk-aversion
and McAfee and McMillan (1987) focused only on the risk-averse bidders and determined the optimal auction.
2In their framework, the number of identical prizes is proportional to the number of bidders. They showed
that an unknown number of bidders could change the results on information aggregation. Common knowledge
of the proportional ratio allows to find the results on information aggregation when the number of bidders is
sufficiently high.
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average. Using an example, this result is discussed. Moreover an answer for the independent-
private-values model is provided.
Expected revenues are not only compared for the war of attrition and the all-pay auc-
tion but also among all-pay and winner-pay mechanisms. Then, we show that the stochastic
competition does not affect the ranking of the expected revenues and the Linkage Principle
as well. It is not an intuitive result. Indeed, we prove that the unknown number of bid-
ders affects bidding strategies differently for the war of attrition, the all-pay auction and the
winner-pay auctions. Moreover bidding strategy comparisons are provided among the all-pay
and winner-pay mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. The model and preliminaries are described in Section
2. The analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auctions are given in Sections 3 and
4. Section 5 compares expected revenues and bidding strategies. Some computational details
are provided in Appendix.
2 Model with Stochastic Competition
The model follows and generalizes the preliminaries of Krishna and Morgan (1997) (hence-
forth K-M) in a stochastic competition setting (as McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Harstad,
Kagel, and Levin (1990) used in the study of winner-pay auctions). There is an indivisible
object that can be allocated to N = {1, 2, ..., n} potential bidders, with n <∞. Every poten-
tial bidder is risk neutral. Firstly, we consider a set of bidders A ⊂ N . Denote |A| = a the
cardinality of set A.
Prior to the auction, each bidder i observes a real-valued signal Xi ∈ [0, x¯]. The value of the
object to bidder i, which depends on his signal and those of the other bidders, is denoted by
Va,i = Va,i(X) = Va(Xi,X−i)
where Va, which is the same function for all bidders, is symmetric in the opponent bidders’
signals X−i = (X1, ..., Xi−1, Xi+1, ..., Xa). It is assumed that Va is non-negative, continuous,
and non-decreasing in each argument. Moreover, the bidders’ valuation for the object is
supposed bounded for all a: EVa,i <∞.
Let f be the joint density of X1, X2, ..., Xa, a symmetric function in the bidders’ signals.
Besides, for any a-tuple y, z ∈ [0, x¯]a with m¯ = {max(yi, zi)}ai=1 and m = {min(yi, zi)}ai=1, f
satisfies the affiliation inequality
f(m¯)f(m) ≥ f(y)f(z).
Affiliation is a strong form of positive correlation as discussed by Milgrom and Weber (1982).
It means that if a bidder’s signal is high, then other bidders’ signals are likely high too.
As a consequence, the competition is likely to be strong. Let FY 1a (.|x) be the conditional
distribution of Y 1a , where Y
1
a = max{Xj}aj=2, given X1 = x and fY 1a (.|x) the corresponding
density function.
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When the number of potential bidders a is common knowledge, we can define
va(x, y) = E(Va,1|X1 = x, Y 1a = y), (1)
the Bayesian assessment of bidder 1 when his private signal is x and the maximal signal of
his opponents is y. As in K-M, we assume that va(x, y) is increasing.
3
We consider the situation in which bidders do not know the number of their rivals when they
choose their strategy. For any subset A of N , we denote piA the probability that A is the set
of active bidders. Moreover, the probabilities piA are independent of the bidders’ identities
and auction rules. Sets with equal cardinality have equal probabilities. Therefore, the ex ante
probability to have a participants in the auction is the sum of probabilities with the same
cardinal a:
sa :=
∑
|A|=a,A⊂N
piA
Let pia bidder i’s updated probability that there are a bidders conditional upon the event
that he is an active bidder. We suppose that these probabilities are common knowledge and
symmetric such as pia = pa. Therefore
4
pia :=
∑
|A|=a,i∈A⊂N
piA∑
i∈B⊂N
piB
and pa = p
i
a =
asa
n∑
i=1
isi
3 Analysis of the War of Attrition
In this section we determine the equilibrium strategies for the war of attrition with affiliated
signals. It is not clear from the first order condition that the equilibrium strategies are
weighted average of the equilibrium strategies that would be chosen for each number of
bidders. Then we consider an independent-private-values model to investigate further this
question.
3.1 General Case with Affiliated Signals
Assume that the number of bidders is common knowledge and each bidder i bids an amount
bi. Thus, the payoff of the bidder i if b is the vector of bids is
Ua,i(b,X) =

Va,i(X)−max
j 6=i
bj if bi > max
j 6=i
bj
1
#Q(b)
Va,i(X)− bi if bi = max
i 6=j
bj
−bi if bi < max
j 6=i
bj
3As Milgrom and Weber (1982) and K-M remark, since X1 and Y
1
a are affiliated, va(x, y) is a non-decreasing
function of its arguments. But they adopted the same assumption.
4For detail, see McAfee and McMillan (1987).
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where i 6= j and Q(b) := {argmaxi bi} is the collection of the highest bids. Strategies at the
symmetric equilibrium are noted βa when the number of bidders a is known. K-M show that
the bidding equilibrium strategy when the bidders are informed about the number of bidders
a is
βa(x) =
∫ x
0
va(y, y)λ(y|y, a)dt (2)
where λ(y|x, a) = fY 1a (y|x)
1− FY 1a (y|x)
and with the following boundary conditions:
βa(0) = 0 and lim
x→x¯βa(x) =∞.
Let us assume the same mechanism for a stochastic number of bidders and denoted βi :
[0, x¯] → R+ a bidder’s i pure strategy, mapping signals into bids. As we consider only the
symmetric equilibria, we focus on the symmetric and increasing pure strategies β ≡ β1 =
β2 = ... = βa. As the number of bidders is stochastic, the definition of the equilibrium
strategy concerns bidders’ beliefs about the number of active bidders. Strategy β is called a
equilibrium strategy if for all bidders i
β(x) ∈ argmaxbi EaE[Ua,i(bi,β(X−i),X)|Xi = x] ∀x ∈ [0, x¯] (3)
where β(X−i) = (β(X1), ...β(Xi−1), β(Xi+1), ..., β(Xa)) and Ea is the expectation operator
with respect to the distribution of the bidders’ beliefs.
The uncertain number of bidders enters the expected utility through the value of the
object for the bidder and the size of the vector of bids b.5. Assume that all bidders except
bidder 1 follow a symmetric – and differentiable – equilibrium strategy. Bidder 1 receives a
signal x and bids an amount b. The expected utility of bidder 1 is
ΠW (b, x) = EaE[Ua,1(b,β(X−1),X)|X1 = x]
= EaE{[Va,1 − β(Y 1a )]1β(Y 1a )≤b − b1β(Y 1a )>b|X1 = x}
= EaE{E{[Va,1 − β(Y 1a )]1β(Y 1a )≤b − b|X1, Y 1a }|X1 = x}
=
∑
a
pa
∫ β−1(b)
0
[va(x, y)− β(y))]fY 1a (y|x)dy − b
[
1−
∑
a
paFY 1a (β
−1(b)|x)
]
(4)
with β−1(.) the inverse function of β(.). The maximization of (4) with respect to b leads to:∑
a
pava(x, β
−1(b))fY 1a (β
−1(b)|x) 1
β′(β−1(b))
−
[
1−
∑
a
paFY 1a (β
−1(b)|x)
]
= 0 (5)
At the symmetric equilibrium b = β(x), thus (5) yields
β′(x) =
∑
a
pava(x, x)fY 1a (x|x)
1−∑i piFY 1i (x|x)
=
∑
a
wa(x)β
′
a(x) (6)
5It also enters through the collection of the highest bids Q(b). Yet, when #Q(b) > 1 the value of the
integral is zero: at least one of the support is an atom. Thus, we do not need to consider it.
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with the weights
wa(x) =
pa(1− FY 1a (x|x))
1−∑i piFY 1i (x|x) (7)
By (2) and (6) we know that β(.) is increasing. It follows that an equilibrium strategy
must be given by
β(x) =
∑
a
wa(x)βa(x)−
∑
a
∫ x
0
w′a(t)βa(t)dt (8)
Thus, we have a necessary condition about the shape of β. We prove that it is indeed
an equilibrium strategy under an additional assumption, as stated in the next theorem. This
assumption provides a sufficient condition for the existence of the symmetric monotonic equi-
librium bidding strategies.
Definition 1. Let φ : R2 −→ R be defined by φ(x, y|a) = va(x, y)λ˜(y|x, a) where λ˜(y|x, a) =
fY 1a (y|x)
1−∑i piFY 1i (y|x) .
φ(., y|a) is the product of va(., y), an increasing function, and λ˜(y|x, a), a non-increasing
function.6 Besides, φ is equivalent to va(x, y)λ(y|x, a) defined by K-M when the number of
agents a is common knowledge.
Assumption 1. φ(x, y|a) is increasing in x for all y.
Theorem 1. Under assumption 1, a symmetric equilibrium in a war of attrition is represented
by
β(x) =
∑
a
wa(x)βa(x)−
∑
a
∫ x
0
w′a(t)βa(t)dt
with βa(t) and wa(t) given by (2) and (7).
Proof. First, β(.) is a continuous and differentiable function. Indeed, by K-M we know that
βa(.) is a continuous and differentiable function. We have to verify the optimality of β(z)
when bidder 1’s signal is x. Using equation (5), we find that
∂ΠW
∂β(z)
(β(z), x) =
∑
a
pava(x, z)fY 1a (z|x)
1
β′(z)
− 1 +
∑
a
paFY 1a (z|x)
=
1
β′(z)
[∑
a
pava(x, z)fY 1a (z|x)−
∑
a
pava(z, z)λ˜(z|z, a)(1−
∑
i
piFY 1i
(z|x))
]
=
1
β′(z)
(1−
∑
i
piFY 1i
(z|x))
∑
a
pa[φ(x, z|a)− φ(z, z|a)]
When x > z, as φ(x|y, a) is increasing in x, it follows that ∂Π
W
∂β(z)
(β(z), x) > 0. In a similar
manner, when x < z,
∂ΠW
∂β(z)
(β(z), x) < 0. Thus,
∂ΠW
∂β(z)
(β(x), x) = 0. As a result, the
maximum of ΠW (β(z), x) is achieved for z = x. 
6This fact can be proved in a similar way that the hazard rate λ(y|x, a) of the distribution FY 1a (y|x) is
non-increasing in x.
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K-M discussed assumption 1 when the number of bidders is common knowledge. This
assumption means that va(., y) increases faster than λ˜(y|x, a) decreases. However, as in the
war of attrition with a fixed number of bidders, this is not a problem. Indeed, this assumption
holds if the affiliation between X and Y 1a is not so strong. We give an example below to
illustrate this discussion with a stochastic number of bidders.7
Example 1. Let f(x) = 2
a
2a+1(1 +
∏a
i=1 xi) on [0, 1]
a with Xi bidder i’s signals and let us
denote fYa(x, y1, y2, ..., ya−1) the joint density of (X1, Y 1a , Y 2a , ..., Y a−1a ) with Y ka the kth-highest
order statistic of (X2, ..., Xa) such as Y
1
a ≥ Y 2a ≥ ... ≥ Y a−1a . Let us consider a ∈ {2, 3}.
Therefore,
fY2(x, y) =
4
5(1 + xy) on [0, 1]
2
fY3(x, y1, y2) =
16
9 (1 + xy1y2)1y1≥y2 on [0, 1]
3
First of all, we can easily verify that the affiliation inequality given holds. We also assume
that va(x, y) = a(x+ y). Then computations lead to
fY 12 (y|x) = 2
1 + xy
2 + x
and FY 12 (y|x) = y
2 + xy
2 + x
fY 13 (y|x) = 4y
2 + xy2
4 + x
and FY 13 (y|x) = y2
4 + xy2
4 + x
We can also verify that FY 1a (y|x) is non-increasing in x. We obtain
φ(x, y|2) = 2(x+ y) 2(1 + xy)(x+ 4)
(x+ 4)(x+ 2)− p2y(2 + xy)(4 + x)− p3y2(4 + xy2)(2 + x)
φ(x, y|3) = 3(x+ y) 4y(2 + xy
2)(2 + x)
(x+ 4)(x+ 2)− p2y(2 + xy)(4 + x)− p3y2(4 + xy2)(2 + x)
Thus, assumption 1 holds (some details are given in appendix).
Using the results where the number of bidders is common knowledge, the boundary con-
dition β(0) = 0 follows. Thus, if the expected value is bounded whatever the number of
potential bidders, then the bidding strategy will be bounded too. Following the same logic
than K-M, we could determine that lim
x→x¯β(x) =∞. Indeed, in this situation,
β(x) ≥
∑
a
pa
∫ x
0
va(y, y)λ˜(y|y, a)dy + min
a
va(z, z) ln
(
1−∑a paFY 1a (z|z)
1−∑a paFY 1a (x|z)
)
Harstad, Kagel, and Levin (1990) and Harstad, Pekec, and Tsetlin (2008) show that the
form of the equilibrium strategies for winner-pay auctions is such that β(x) =
∑
awa(x)βa(x).
However, this result is not obvious for the war of attrition. Indeed, contrary to winner-pay
auctions and the all-pay auction (cf infra.), in the case of the war attrition, it is not a direct
result of the first order condition that the equilibrium strategy should be equal to a weighted
average. Yet, the following example illustrates in a simple case that the bidding strategy in
the war of attrition with stochastic competition could be written as a weighted average of the
bidding strategies that would have been chosen for each number of competitors.
7This example generalizes an example of K-M with two – fixed – bidders.
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Example 2. Let f(x) = 2a
∏a
i=1 xi on [0, 1]
a with Xi bidder i’s signals and let a ∈ {2, 3}.
As in Example 1 we assume that va(x, y) = a(x+ y). Therefore,
fY2(x, y) = 4xy on [0, 1]
2
fY3(x, y1, y2) = 16xy1y21y1≥y2 on [0, 1]3
We can easily verify that the affiliation inequality and the assumption 1 hold. Then the
equilibrium strategies for a fixed number of bidders are given by
β2(x) = 8
∫ x
0
y2
1− y2dy
= −8x+ 4 ln 1 + x
1− x
and
toto
β3(x) = 24
∫ x
0
y4
1− y4dy
= 24
(
−x+ 1
4
ln
1 + x
1− x + arctanx
)
When the number of bidders is stochastic and p2 = p3 = 0.5
β(x) = 8
∫ x
0
y2
1 + 3x2
2− x2 − x4dy
= −8
3
∫ x
0
2
y
y + 1
+ 2
y
y − 1 + 5
y2
y2 + 2
dy
= −12x+ 16
3
ln
1 + x
1− x +
16
√
2
3
arctan
x√
2
All these bidding strategies are depicted in Figure 1. The bidding strategy with a stochastic
number of bidders β (solid line) is always higher than the bidding strategy with 2 bidders (long
dashed line) and lower than the bidding strategy with 3 bidders (short dashed line) for all
value of x. Then we can find a vector of weights such as the bidding strategy with stochastic
competition would be written as a weighted average of the bidding strategies with a fixed number
of bidders.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 x
10
20
30
40
Β2!x", Β3!x", Β!x"
Figure 1: Bidding strategies β2, β3 and β.
3.2 An Example: Independent-Private-Values Model
As we have seen previously, and despite Example 2, it is not obvious that the equilibrium
strategy in the war of attrition is equal to a weighted average such that β(x) =
∑
awa(x)βa(x).
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In this section, we provide an answer for the IPV model.
Let us consider that each bidder i assigns value Xi to the object, independently distributed
on [0, x¯] from the identically distribution F . Therefore, the bidding strategy where the number
of bidders a is common knowledge is
βa(x) = (a− 1)
∫ x
0
yf(y)F a−2(y)
1− F a−1(y) dy
and the bidding strategy with stochastic competition is given by
β(x) =
∑
a
pa(a− 1)
∫ x
0
yf(y)F a−2(y)
1−∑i piF i−1(y)dy
.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium strategy in a war of attrition is decreasing in a for all a ≥ 2.
Proof.
∂βa
∂a
(x) =
∫ x
0
yf(y)F a−2(y)
(1− F a−1(y))2 [1− F
a−1(y) + (a− 1) lnF (y)]dy
As 1− F a−1(y) + (a− 1) lnF (y) is negative for all a, y, the result follows. 
If β(x) ∈ [βa(x), βa¯(x)] for all x with βa(x) = mina{βa(x)∀a ∈ N |sa > 0} and βa¯(x) =
maxa{βa(x)∀a ∈ N |sa > 0} then we can find a vector of weights (za(.))a with
∑
a za(.) =
1, za(.) ≥ 0 for all x such that β(x) =
∑
a za(x)βa(x). Thus, we state:
Proposition 1. In an IPV model, the equilibrium strategy in the war of attrition with stochas-
tic competition is a weighted average of equilibrium strategies where the number of bidders is
common knowledge.
Proof. We have to distinguish two cases. Indeed from Lemma 1 either p1 = 0 and then
βa¯(x) = β2(x) or p1 > 0 and βa(x) = βn(x).
β(x)− β2(x) =
∫ x
0
yf(y)
[1−∑i piF i−1(y)][1− F (y)]
[∑
a
pa(a− 1)F a−2(y)−
∑
a
pa(a− 2)F a−1(y)− 1
]
dy
As
∑
a pa(a− 1)F a−2(y)−
∑
a pa(a− 2)F a−1(y)− 1 is negative, β(x) ≤ β2(x).
If p1 > 0 βa(x) = β1(x) = 0 then the result follows. However if p1 = 0:
β(x)− βn(x) =
∫ x
0
yf(y)
[1−∑i>1 piF i−1(y)][1− Fn−1(y)]
∑
a>1
pak(y, a)dy
where k(y, a) = (a− 1)F a−2(y) + (n− a)Fn+a−3(y)− (n− 1)Fn−2(y) is positive for all a ≥ 2
and y.
Thus in both cases, p1 = 0 and p1 > 0, β(x) ∈ [βa(x), βa¯(x)] for all x and the equilibrium
strategy with stochastic competition can be written as a weighted average of equilibrium
strategies with a fixed number of bidders. 
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The next example considers uniform distributions and at most three bidders. Then an
explicit shape of the vector of weights is determined. Even in this simple case, this vector
cannot be written as easily as for the winner-pay auctions.
Example 3. Let us consider the value Xi is given by a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and the
number of bidders a could be 2 or 3. Then the equilibrium strategies for a fixed number of
bidders are given by
β2(x) =
∫ x
0
y
1− ydy
= −x− ln(1− x)
and
toto
β3(x) = 2
∫ x
0
y2
1− y2dy
= −2x+ ln 1 + x
1− x
When the number of bidders is stochastic
β(x) =
∫ x
0
p2y + 2p3y
2
1− p2y − p3y2dy
= −2x−
∫ x
0
2− p2y
p3(y − 1)(y − yo)dy
= −2x− 1
p3
2− p2
1− yo ln(1− x) +
1
p3
2− p2yo
1− yo ln[−yo(x− yo)]
where yo =
−p2 −
√
p22 + 4p3
2p3
and belongs to (−2,−1].
Using Proposition 1 there exists a vector of weights (z2(.), z3(.)) such that z2(x)β2(x) +
z3(x)β3(x) = β(x) for all x ∈ (0, 1]. It follows that
z3(x) =
−x+ ln(1− x)−
∫ x
0
2− p2y
p3(y − 1)(y − yo)dy
−x+ ln(1 + x) and z2(x) = 1− z3(x) for all x ∈ (0, 1].
Remark that if p2 = 0 then z3(x) = 1 for all x.
8 Moreover it is routine to verify that
z3(x) ∈ [0, 1].
4 Analysis of the All-Pay Auction
As before assume the number of bidders is common knowledge and each bidder i bids an
amount bi. Thus, the payoff of the bidder i is
Ua,i(b,X) =

Va,i(X)− bi if bi > max
j 6=i
bj
1
#Q(b)
Va,i(X)− bi if bi = max
i 6=j
bj
−bi if bi < max
j 6=i
bj
where i 6= j and Q(b) := {argmaxi bi} is the collection of the highest bids. Strategies at the
symmetric equilibrium are noted αa when the number of bidders a is known. K-M show that
8Indeed −
∫ x
0
2− p2y
p3(y − 1)(y − yo)dy = 2
∫ x
0
dy
1− y2 .
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the bidding equilibrium strategy when the bidders are informed about the number of bidders
a is
αa(x) =
∫ x
0
va(t, t)fY 1a (t|t)dt (9)
with the following boundary conditions:
αa(0) = 0 and lim
x→x¯αa(x) = limx→x¯ va(x, x). (10)
As for the war of attrition, we focus only on the symmetric pure strategies α : [0, x¯]→ R+,
called an equilibrium strategy if for all bidders i (such that i ≤ a)
α(x) ∈ argmaxbi EaE[Ua,i(bi,α(X−i),X)|Xi = x] ∀x ∈ [0, x¯]
where α(X−i) = (α(X1), ...α(Xi−1), α(Xi+1), ..., α(Xa)).
Assume that all bidders except bidder 1 follow a symmetric – and differentiable – equi-
librium strategy. Bidder 1 receives a signal x and bids an amount b. The expected utility of
bidder 1 is
ΠA(b, x) = EaE[Ua,1(b,α(X−1),X)|X1 = x]
= EaE[Va,11α(Y 1a )≤b − b|X1 = x]
= EaE[E[Va,11α(Y 1a )≤b − b|X1, Y 1a ]|X1 = x]
=
∑
a
pa
∫ α−1(b)
0
[va(x, y)− α(y))]fY 1a (y|x)dy − b (11)
with α−1(.) the inverse function of α(.). The maximisation of (11) with respect to b leads, at
the symmetric equilibrium b = α(x), to
α′(x) =
∑
a
paα
′
a(x) (12)
By (9) and (12) the bidding strategy α(.) is an increasing function. It follows from the
boundary condition (10) that an equilibrium strategy must be given by
α(x) =
∑
a
paαa(x) (13)
Once again, we have only a necessary condition about the shape of the equilibrium strat-
egy. Under assumption9 1 we prove that α(.) is indeed an equilibrium strategy, as stated in
the next theorem.
9Indeed, this assumption implies that va(., y)fY 1a (y|.) is increasing for all y. The proof is similar to the
proof of Proposition 3 of K-M.
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Theorem 2. Under assumption 1, a symmetric equilibrium in an all-pay auction, denoted
α(.), is a weighted average of equilibrium strategies, denoted αa(.), that would be chosen for
each number of bidders such that α(x) =
∑
a paαa(x).
Proof. To prove that α is optimal, we follow the same way that for the war of attrition. α(.) is
a continuous and differentiable function. Indeed, by K-M we know that αa(.) is a continuous
and differentiable function. We verify the optimality of α(z) when bidder 1’s signal is x.
Using equation (12), we find that
∂ΠA
∂α(z)
(α(z), x) =
∑
a
pava(x, z)fY 1a (z|x)
1
α′(z)
− 1
=
1
α′(z)
∑
a
pa[va(x, z)fY 1a (z|x)− va(z, z)fY 1a (z|z)]
As we said before, assumption 1 implies that va(x, y)fY 1a (y|x) is increasing in x for all y. When
x > z, it follows that
∂ΠA
∂α(z)
(α(z), x) > 0. In a similar manner, when x < z,
∂ΠA
∂α(z)
(α(z), x) <
0. Thus,
∂ΠA
∂α(z)
(α(x), x) = 0. As a result, the maximum of ΠA(α(z), x) is achieved for
z = x. 
Using the results where the number of bidders is common knowledge, the boundary con-
dition α(0) = 0 follows. Thus, if the expected value is bounded whatever the number of
potential bidders, then the bidding strategy will be bounded too. Following the same logic
than K-M, we could determine that lim
x→x¯α(x) = limx→x¯maxa va(x, x).
Thus, the bidders’ beliefs about the number of competitors is crucial to determine the
equilibrium strategies. Indeed, the stochastic number of bidders does not affect the bidders’
strategies at the equilibrium of the all-pay auction and the war of attrition in the same way.
5 Bidding Strategy and Revenue Comparisons
In this section we investigate the expected revenue comparisons for the war of attrition and
the all-pay auction. We also compare the expected revenues and the equilibrium strategies
obtained from the all-pay and winner-pay mechanisms. Finally the Linkage Principle is
discussed.10 The probability that a potential bidder i is taking part of the auction is given
by
∑
i∈A piA. Let us denote e
d(.) the expected payment of the current bidder i in an auction
design d. Then the expected revenue is
∑n
i=1[
∑
i∈A piA]Ee
d(X).
5.1 War of Attrition versus All-Pay Auction
K-M show that the expected revenue from the war of attrition is greater than the expected
revenue from the all-pay auction when the number of bidders is known and signals affiliated.
10Note that the proofs of the expected revenue comparisons use the same logic than the proofs of K-M.
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In our stochastic setting, it is not obvious that this result still holds. Indeed, the uncer-
tainty about the number of bidders has various consequences on the bidders’ strategies at the
equilibrium. As opposed to the all-pay auction, the equilibrium bidding strategy in the war
of attrition is not average with weight pa of the bidding strategies for each fixed number of
bidders. Intuitively it is difficult to determine from the equilibrium bidding strategies how
the stochastic competition modifies the ranking of the expected revenues. However, as we
state in the next proposition, the stochastic competition does not affect the ranking of the
expected revenues.
Proposition 2. Under assumption 1, the expected revenue from the war of attrition is greater
than or equal to the expected revenue from the all-pay auction.
Proof. Denote eA(.), the bidders’ expected payment in the all-pay auction at the symmetric
equilibrium and eW (.) in the war of attrition. Then, under assumption 1,
eW (x) =
∫ x
0
β(y)
∑
a
pafY 1a (x|x)dy + β(x)(1−
∑
a
paFY 1a (y|x))
= β(x)−
∫ x
0
β′(y)
∑
a
paFY 1a (y|x)dy
=
∑
a
∫ x
0
wa(y)β
′
a(y)dy −
∑
a
∫ x
0
wa(y)β
′
a(y)
∑
i
piFY 1i
(y|x)dy
=
∑
a
∫ x
0
wa(y)β
′
a(y)(1−
∑
i
piFY 1i
(y|x))dy
=
∑
a
pa
∫ x
0
va(y, y)fY 1a (y|y)
1−∑i piFY 1i (y|x)
1−∑i piFY 1i (y|y)dy
≥ α(x)
As eA(x) = α(x) and FY 1i
(y|.) is a non-increasing function for all y, the war of attrition
outperforms the all-pay auction. 
5.2 War of Attrition versus Second-Price Auction
Our second result describes, under Assumption 1, the ranking of the equilibrium strategies
from the war of attrition and the second-price auction.
Proposition 3. Under assumption 1, the equilibrium strategies from the war of attrition and
the second-price auction intersect at least once.
Proof. Denote ωII(.), the bidding strategy at the symmetric equilibrium in the second-price
winner-pay auction. Following Harstad, Kagel, and Levin (1990) the equilibrium strategy is
given by ωII(x) =
∑
a
pafY 1a (x|x)∑
i pifY 1i
(x|x)va(x, x).
Then,
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E[ωII(Y )|X1 = x, Y 1a < x] =
∑
a
pa
∫ x
0
va(y, y)fY 1a (y|y)
∑
i pifY 1i
(y|x)∑
i pifY 1i
(y|y)∑i piFY 1i (x|x)dy
In addition,
E[β(Y )|X1 = x, Y 1a < x] =
∫ x
0 β(y)
∑
a pafY 1a (y|x)dy∑
i piFY 1i
(x|x)
= β(x)−
∫ x
0
β′(y)
∑
a paFY 1a (y|x)∑
i piFY 1i
(x|x) dy
=
∑
a
∫ x
0
wa(y)β
′
a(y)dy −
∑
a
∫ x
0
wa(y)β
′
a(y)
∑
i piFY 1i
(y|x)∑
i piFY 1i
(x|x)dy
=
∑
a
∫ x
0
wa(y)β
′
a(y)
∑
i piFY 1i
(x|x)−∑i piFY 1i (y|x)∑
i piFY 1i
(x|x) dy
=
∑
a
pa
∫ x
0
va(y, y)fY 1a (y|y)
∑
i piFY 1i
(x|x)−∑i piFY 1i (y|x)
(1−∑i piFY 1i (y|y))∑i piFY 1i (x|x)dy
From the affiliation inequality it follows for all y ≤ x that
∫ x
y
∑
i
pifY 1i
(t|x)dt∑
i
pifY 1i
(y|x) <
∫ x¯
y
∑
i
pifY 1i
(t|y)dt∑
i
pifY 1i
(y|y)
if x is sufficiently low and
∫ x
y
∑
i
pifY 1i
(t|x)dt∑
i
pifY 1i
(y|x) >
∫ x¯
y
∑
i
pifY 1i
(t|y)dt∑
i
pifY 1i
(y|y) if x sufficiently high.
It follows that E[β(Y )|X1 = x, Y 1a < x] < E[ωII(Y )|X1 = x, Y 1a < x] if x is sufficiently
low and E[β(Y )|X1 = x, Y 1a < x] > E[ωII(Y )|X1 = x, Y 1a < x] if x is sufficiently high.

K-M also show that the expected revenue from the war of attrition is greater than the
expected revenue from the second-price winner-pay auction when the number of bidders is
known and signals affiliated. For similar reasons than above, it is not obvious that this result
still holds here. Yet, as we state in the next proposition, the stochastic competition still does
not affect the ranking of the expected revenues.
Proposition 4. Under assumption 1, the expected revenue from the war of attrition is greater
than or equal to the expected revenue from the second-price auction.
Proof. Denote eII(.) the expected payment at the symmetric equilibrium in the second-price
winner-pay auction such as
eII(x) =
∑
i
piFY 1i
(x|x)E[ωII(Y )|X1 = x, Y 1a < x]
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with ωII(x) =
∑
a
pafY 1a (x|x)∑
i pifY 1i
(x|x)va(x, x).
eW (x) =
∑
a
pa
∫ x
0
va(y, y)fY 1a (y|y)
1−∑i piFY 1i (y|x)
1−∑i piFY 1i (y|y)dy
≥
∑
a
pa
∫ x
0
va(y, y)fY 1a (y|y)
∑
i pifY 1i
(y|x)∑
i pifY 1i
(y|y)dy
=eII(x)
To get this result remark that∑
i pifY 1i
(y|y)
1−∑i piFY 1i (y|y) ≥
∑
i pifY 1i
(y|x)
1−∑i piFY 1i (y|x)
holds for all y ≤ x.11 
5.3 All-Pay Auction versus First-Price Auction
The next Proposition describes, under assumption 1, the ranking of the equilibrium strategies
from the all-pay auction and the first-price auction. We show in an example that these two
bidding strategies are not strictly ordered for a fixed number of bidders for all range of x.
Proposition 5. Under assumption 1, the equilibrium strategies from the all-pay auction and
the first-price auction intersect at least once.
Proof. Denote ωI(.), the bidding equilibrium strategy in the first-price winner-pay auction
such as (see Harstad, Kagel, and Levin (1990)) ωI(x) =
∑
a
paFY 1a (x|x)∑
i piFY 1i
(x|x)ω
I
a(x) with ω
I
a(x) =∫ x
0
va(y, y)
fY 1a (y|y)
FY 1a (y|y)
exp
{
−
∫ x
y
fY 1a (t|t)
FY 1a (t|t)
dt
}
dy.
Let us consider the Example 1 for va(x, y) = ax. If bidding strategies cannot be strictly
ordered for p2 = 1 they cannot be strictly ordered neither for p2 < 1. Computations lead to
α2(x) =
∫ x
0
y
1 + y2
2 + y
dy
=
4
3
x3 − x2 + 20x− 40 ln x+ 2
2
and
11This fact can be proved in a similar way that the hazard rate λ(y|x, a) of the distribution FY 1a (y|x) is
non-increasing in x.
15
ωI2(x) =
∫ x
0
y
1 + y2
2 + y
dy
= 4
∫ x
0
1 + y2
2 + y2
exp
{
−
∫ x
y
1 + t2
2t+ t3
dt
}
dy
= 4
∫ x
0
(
1− 1
2 + y2
)
exp
{
−
∫ x
y
(
1
t
+
t
2 + t2
)
dt
}
dy
= 4
∫ x
0
y
x
(
2 + y2
2 + x2
)1/2
− y
x
(2 + y2)−1/2
(2 + x2)1/2
dy
=
4
3x
(x2 − 1) + 4
√
2
3x(2 + x2)1/2
As ωI2(0.15) = 0.15 > α2(0.15) = 0.09 and ω
I
2(0.75) = 0.79 < α2(0.75) = 2.26 the result
follows. 
Our next result compares the expected revenues obtained from the all-pay auction and
the first-price auction. Equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-price winner-pay auction
and the all-pay auction with stochastic competition can be written as weighted average of
equilibrium strategies that would be chosen for each number of bidders. However the weight of
the average are different and cannot be strictly ranked. Then once again, it is not obvious that
results with exogenous number of bidders still holds. Yet, as we state in the next proposition,
the stochastic competition does not affect the ranking of the expected revenues.
Proposition 6. Under assumption 1, the expected revenue from the all-pay auction is greater
than or equal to the expected revenue from the first-price auction.
Proof. Denote eI(.) the expected payment at the symmetric equilibrium in the first-price
winner-pay auction such as
eI(x) =
∑
i
piFY 1i
(x|x)ωI(x)
Then,
eI(x) =
∑
a
paFY 1a (x|x)
∑
i
piFY 1a (x|x)∑
a paFY 1a (x|x)
ωIi (x)
=
∑
a
pa
∫ x
0
va(y, y)fY 1a (y|y)
FY 1a (x|x)
FY 1a (y|y)
exp
{
−
∫ x
y
fY 1a (t|t)
FY 1a (t|t)
dt
}
dy
≤
∑
a
pa
∫ x
0
va(y, y)fY 1a (y|y)dy
=eA(x)
To get this result remark that12 exp
{
−
∫ x
y
fY 1a (t|t)
FY 1a (t|t)
dt
}
≤ FY 1a (x|x)
FY 1a (y|y)
for all y ≤ x. 
12This fact is proved by K-M page 353.
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5.4 Linkage Principle
When the number of bidders is common knowledge, Milgrom and Weber (1982) and K-M
determine a ranking relationship in the expected revenue among first and second-price in
winner-pay and all-pay auctions. That derives from the comparison of the statistical linkages
between the bidder’s expected payment and his signal. This result, called linkage principle,
is based on the affiliation.
Let us consider bidder 1. Let eM (z, x) be his expected payment with a bid z and a signal
x in the auction mechanism M and eM2 (x, x) be the derivative with respect to the second
argument at z = x.
Theorem 3 (K-M’s Linkage Principle, 1997). Suppose M and L are two auction mechanisms
with symmetric and increasing equilibria such that eM (0, 0) = eL(0, 0) = 0. If for all x,
eM2 (x, x) ≥ eL2 (x, x) then for all x eM (x, x) ≥ eL(x, x).
The linkage principle is still satisfied with the stochastic competition. To see this formally,
consider the auction mechanism M and let ΠM (z, x) be the expected payoff of a bidder with
a bid z and a signal x. Then,
ΠM (z, x) = R(z, x)− eM (z, x)
=
∑
a
pa
∫ z
0
va(x, y)fY 1a (y|x)dy − eM (z, x)
The expected gain of winning is the same in all mechanisms with stochastic competition
(as in the case of a fixed number of bidders). Moreover the stochastic number of bidders is
integrated in the expected payment and then does not affect the linkage principle properties.
We could apply the linkage principle to compare the expected payment between winner-pay
and all-pay mechanisms and then get the same results than above.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we determine the equilibrium strategies in the war of attrition and the all-pay
auction with affiliated values and stochastic competition. We establish a sufficient condition
for the existence of the monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies. We have shown that in
the war of attrition, in opposite to the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auctions, it does
not directly follow from the first order condition that the equilibrium strategy is equal to
a weighted average. Even if stochastic competition affects the all-pay auction and the war
of attrition in different ways, we prove that it does not modify the ranking of the expected
revenues and the K-M’s linkage principle.
Our results can be useful for many applications of all-pay designs such as in contest theory
and charity auctions. Indeed, recent papers compare all-pay and winner-pay auctions to raise
money for charity and suggest to use an all-pay design. In particular, Goeree, Maasland,
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Onderstal, and Turner (2005) show that the second-price all-pay auction is better to raise
money for charity than the first-price all-pay auction and the winner-pay auctions. Charity
auctions may be implemented for special events or on the Internet. A large number of charity
auctions take place while potential bidders do not know the number of competitors.13 As
we do not introduce externalities in the bidders’ payoff, our results could not be applied to
charity auctions. However, as they change some insights in the second-price all-pay auction
this work lets us open questions for future research on charity auctions.
7 Appendix
Boundary Condition of the Equilibrium Strategy for the war of attrition.
β(x) =
∑
a
pa
∫ z
0
va(y, y)λ˜(y|y, a)dy +
∑
a
pa
∫ x
z
va(y, y)λ˜(y|y, a)dy
≥
∑
a
pa
∫ z
0
va(y, y)λ˜(y|y, a)dy +
∑
a
pa
∫ x
z
va(z, z)λ˜(y|z, a)dy
≥
∑
a
pa
∫ z
0
va(y, y)λ˜(y|y, a)dy + min
a
va(z, z)
∫ x
z
∑
a
paλ˜(y|z, a)dy
=
∑
a
pa
∫ z
0
va(y, y)λ˜(y|y, a)dy + min
a
va(z, z) ln
(
1−∑a paFY 1a (z|z)
1−∑a paFY 1a (x|z)
)
Boundary Condition of the Equilibrium Strategy for the all-pay auction.
α(x) =
∑
a
pa
∫ x
0
va(y, y)fY 1a (y|y)dy
≤
∑
a
pa
∫ x
0
va(x, y)fY 1a (y|x)dy (14)
≤ max
a
va(x, x)
∫ x
0
∑
a
pafY 1a (y|x)dy
≤ max
a
va(x, x)
(14) is a consequence of assumption 1.
Derivation of Example 1.
∂
∂x
φ1(x, y|2) = 4
(x+ 2)(1− p2FY 12 (y|x)− p3FY 13 (y|x))
[
y2 + 2xy2 + 1− (x+ y)(xy + 1)
x+ 2
− (x+ y)(xy + 1)
−p3y4x+4 + p3(xy
2+4)y2
(x+4)2
− p2y2x+2 + p2(xy
2+2y)
(x+2)2
1− p2FY 12 (y|x)− p3FY 13 (y|x)
]
13They can know the number of their potential opponents but not the number of their active rivals.
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∂∂x
φ1(x, y|3) = 12y
(x+ 4)(1− p2FY 12 (y|x)− p3FY 13 (y|x))
[
y3 + 2xy2 + 2− (x+ y)(xy
2 + 2)
x+ 4
− (x+ y)(xy2 + 2)
−p3y4x+4 + p3y
2(xy2+4)
(x+4)2
− p2y2x+2 + p2y(xy+2)(x+2)2
1− p2FY 12 (y|x)− p3FY 13 (y|x)
]
Computations lead to non-negative derivatives.
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